CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-PARKED MOTOR HOME HELD

To

BE WITHIN SCOPE OF AUTOMOBILE

Ex-

To WARRANT REQUIREMENT-California v. Carney,
471 U.S. 386 (1985).
CEPTION

The United States Supreme Court has developed a number
of exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.'
No exception has created more confusion than the automobile
exception.' The Supreme Court has sought to justify this exception through two rationales: exigency 3 and the lesser expectation
of privacy afforded to motor vehicles. 4 Inconsistent utilization of
1 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV.
The United States Supreme Court has maintained that governmental searches
and seizures conducted without a prior judicial warrant are presumptively unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 402 U.S. 443, 454-55, 478-82
(1971); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The Court, however, has permitted warrantless searches and
seizures in "a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz,
389 U.S. at 357 (footnote omitted). The main exceptions to the warrant requirement are search incident to arrest, the automobile exception, consent, plain view,
hot pursuit, stop and frisk, and border searches. See Note, Warrantless Vehicle Searches
and the Fourth Amendment: The Burger Court Attacks the Exclusionary Rule, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 105, 107-08 (1982).
2 In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), Justice Rehnquist found the
Court's interpretation of the automobile exception to be "something less than a
seemless web." Id. at 440. Justice Powell in a concurring opinion in Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981) found the automobile exception to be "intolerably confusing" and stated that "[t]he Court apparently cannot agree even on
what it has held previously, let alone on how these cases should be decided." Robbins, 453 U.S. at 430 (Powell, J., concurring).
3 In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Court recognized that
the privacy interests in an automobile are constitutionally protected. Nevertheless,
the Court held that automobiles' ready mobility justify a lesser degree of protection. The Court reasoned:
[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by
the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a
search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship,
motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
4 In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the Court noted that
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these two rationales, however, has complicated the application of
the automobile exception.5 The Court has upheld warrantless
vehicle searches by relying on either one 6 or both rationales 7 .
The Court has also justified these searches based solely on probable cause.' The Court's failure, however, to develop a definitive
standard for the automobile exception, has resulted in an area of
law which perplexes lawyers and judges alike. 9 The complexities
surrounding the use of this exception are heightened when the
vehicle in question is a motor home. l ° The Court confronted
this issue in California v. Carney."

On May 31, 1979, two agents from the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) undertook surveillance in downtown San
-[b]esides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly
less than that relating to one's home or office." Id. at 367 (footnote omitted).
5 See Gardner, Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and Their Contents: FourthAmendment Considerations in a Post-Ross World, 62 NEB. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983). The author
notes:
The Court has attempted in these cases to clarify the scope of the exception, particularly as it relates to searches of containers found within
automobiles. Unfortunately, such efforts have failed to clearly define
the scope of the authority to conduct warrantless searches of vehicles.
Moreover, the Court has seemed uncertain about the rationale supporting the automobile exception, vascillating between theories which focused on the impracticality of obtaining search warrants given the
mobility of vehicles, and those which excused warrantless vehicular
searches because such intrusions supposedly offend only minimal privacy expectations.
Id.; see also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1980), where Justice Powell
observed: "The law of search and seizure with respect to automobiles is intolerably
confusing." Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
6 See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion) (lesser
expectation of privacy rationale); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (exigency rationale). For a detailed discussion of Cardwell, see infra notes 74-91 and
accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of Carroll, see infra notes 40-48 and
accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). For a discussion of Ross,
see infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam). For a discussion of
White, see infra note 73.
9 In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), Justice Rehnquist found the
Court's interpretation of the automobile exception to be "something less than a
seemless web." Id. at 440. Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion in Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981), found the automobile exception to be "intolerably confusing" and stated that "[t]he Court apparently cannot agree even on
what it has held previously, let alone on how these cases should be decided." Id.
(Powell, J., concurring).
10 See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of why a motor
home should provide greater privacy rights to its owners.
I1 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
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Diego of suspected drug dealer, Lee Bowman. 2 During the surveillance, agent Williams observed Charles Carney approach a
Mexican boy. 3 Carney and the youth walked to a nearby parking
lot and entered a Dodge Mini Motor Home.' 4 Carney closed all
curtains in the motor home including the one across the front
windshield. 5 The license number on the motor home was consistent with uncorroborated anonymous information that Williams had received from an organization known as WeTIP. 16
assistance to aid in the surWilliams then called for additional
17
home.
motor
the
of
veillance
The youth left the motor home approximately an hour and
fifteen minutes later.18 The two DEA agents along with James
Clem, a San Diego narcotics officer, approached the boy and
asked him what had happened in the motor home.' 9 The boy
told the agents that he had received marijuana from the occupant
of the vehicle in return for sexual favors. 2 0 Upon the agents' request, the boy knocked on the door of the motor home and asked
12

People v. Carney, 34 Cal.3d 597, 602, 668 P.2d 807, 808, 194 Cal.Rptr. 500,

501-02 (1983), rev'd, 386 U.S. 471 (1985).
13 Id. Agent Williams stated that he had taken notice of Carney because "he did
not look like he fit in the area there, and he was approaching a Mexican boy and
talking to him." Id., 668 P.2d at 808, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 502.
14 Carney, 471 U.S. at 388. Several factors suggest that the officers might have
been able to obtain a search warrant. People v. Carney, 34 Cal.3d 597, 610 n.8,
668 P.2d 807, 814 n.8, 194 Cal.Rptr. 500, 507 n.8 (1983). First, the incident took
place on a weekday afternoon. Id. Second, the mobile home was located in a parking lot only a few blocks from the courthouse. Id.
15 Carney, 471 U.S. at 388.
16 People v. Carney, 172 Cal.Rptr. 430, 432 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). WeTIP
stands for "We Turn In Pushers." Id. at 432 n.2. It is an organization that provides
telephone services whereby people may anonymously call up and provide information about drug transactions. Id. The information would then be passed on to a
law enforcement agency by WeTIP. Id.
In Carney, the information came from a letter and anonymous telephone calls.
Id. at 432. This information alleged that narcotics were being distributed from this
particular mobile home. Id. Carney was linked as the vehicle's driver, along with
Lee Bowman and Louis A. Gonzales. Id. The information stated that these men
gave narcotics to young boys in exchange for sexual services. Id. Bowman and his
cohorts conducted their business in downtown San Diego near the Horton Plaza.
Id. WeTIP further charged that the curtains of the mobile home would be closed
during the activities which would last anywhere between ten minutes and two
hours. Id. at 432.
17 People v. Carney, 34 Cal.3d 597, 602, 668 P.2d 807, 809, 194 Cal.Rptr. 500,
502 (1983). Officer Clem, a San Diego narcotics officer, responded to agent Williams' call for assistance. People v. Carney, 172 Cal.Rptr. 430, 432-33 (1981).
18 Carney, 471 U.S. at 388.

19 Id.
20

Id.
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Carney to come out. 2 I As Carney stepped out, Officer Clem entered the motor home to check for other occupants. 22 Clem observed in plain view two bags of marijuana, a scale and some
ziploc bags. 23 Carney was arrested and the motor home was
taken to the police station. 24 A warrantless inventory search of
the motor home led to the discovery of additional marijuana.2 5
Thereafter, Carney was charged with possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute.2 6
At the preliminary hearing, Carney moved to suppress the
21 Id.

22 Id. The following excerpts from the trial record help illustrate what had transpired after the boy knocked on the door of the mobile home:
Cross examination of agent Williams:
Q Did [Carney] then step outside?
A. Yes, sir.
Q And prior to stepping outside did you tell him something?
A. Possibly, yes, very possibly, we asked him to step out. I don't
remember for sure that we asked him to step out, but - whether he
stepped voluntarily or we asked him, I don't remember.
Q. Did you then ask him to face you?
A. I don't remember that per se, no.
Q. Well, what was Mr. Carney's position at the time that Agent
Clem stepped into the vehicle?
A. I believe as Mr. Carney stepped out, Agent Clem stepped up
on the steps, looked in, and stepped back out and told me what was
observed, to the best of my knowledge.
Q And the first step is inside the van, is it not?
A. Yes, sir. Well
Q. In other words, there is an exterior door on the van, is there
not?
A. Yes, it is probably an exterior step that would be outside the
van. Whether it was down or not, I don't know. From what I remember,
Agent Clem stepped in where the door would have locked, stepped on
that step and looked in.
Q. So he had his body and feet inside the van at the time when he
looked, did he not?
A. I believe so. You would have to ask Agent Clem.
Joint Appendix at 19-21, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (No. 83-859).
Direct Examination of Agent Clem:
Q. What did you do when the defendant answered the door?
A. The first thing, I identified myself as a police officer. The defendant then stepped down out of the motor home at about the same
time I stepped in the motor home to check to see if there were any other
occupants in the vehicle.
Q. Now, why did you do that?
A. Safety reasons, to see if anybody else was in there.
Id. at 21-22.
23 Carney, 471 U.S. at 388.
24 Id.
25 Id. The marijuana was found in both the cupboards and the refrigerator. Id.
26 Id.
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evidence that was seized in the motor home.2 7 The magistrate
denied Carney's motion and determined that the initial search
was justified because agent Clem had probable cause to look for
other occupants.2" In addition, the magistrate upheld the subsequent search, reasoning that it was an inventory search.2 9 Carney
renewed his motion to suppress the evidence in the superior
court, but was again unsuccessful.3 0 He then pleaded nolo contendere to the charges and was subsequently placed on
probation. 3 '
On appeal from the probation order, the California Court of
Appeal determined that since motor homes possess the same mobility as other vehicles, they are within the scope of the automobile exception.3 2 The court then held that the existence of
probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the search inside the motor home for other occupants and the subsequent
seizure of evidence in plain view.3 3 The California Supreme
Court reversed, maintaining that the prime justification for the
automobile exception was not mobility, but that automobiles had
a diminished expectation of privacy.3 4 The court further stated
that the expectation of privacy in a motor home was more similar
to that of a residence than that of an automobile 5 Accordingly,
Id.
Id.
Id. Carney moved in the California Superior Court to suppress the evidence
on the basis that it was obtained through an illegal search and seizure. Id.
30 Id. The superior court, in denying Carney's motion to suppress the evidence,
held that: "(1) there was sufficient probable cause to arrest defendant; (2) the
search of the motor home was authorized under the automobile exception; and (3)
the motor home itself could be seized as an instrumentality of the crime." People
v. Carney, 34 Cal.3d 597, 603, 668 P.2d 807, 809, 194 Cal.Rptr. 500, 502 (1983).
3i Carney, 471 U.S. at 388-89.
32 People v. Carney, 172 Cal.Rptr. 430, 434-35, (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd, 34
Cal.3d 597, 668 P.2d 807, 194 Cal.Rptr. 500 (1983), rev'd, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
33 Carney, 172 Cal.Rptr. at 434-35.
34 People v. Carney, 34 Cal.3d at 614, 668 P.2d at 817, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 510.
35 Id. at 606-07, 668 P.2d at 812, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 504-05. In finding that mobile homes were generally used as a residence, the California Supreme Court reviewed the CAL. VEH. CODE § 396 and the HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 18008. Id. at
606, 668 P.2d at 812, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 505. CAL. VEH. CODE § 396 (West Supp.
1984) provides that:
"Mobile home" is a structure as defined in section 18008 of the Health
and Safety Code. *** For the purposes of enforcement of highway
safety laws and regulations, a mobile home is a trailer coach which is in
excess of eight feet in width or in excess of 40 feet in length **
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 18008 (West 1984) provides that:
"Mobile home," for the purposes of this part, means a structure transportable in one or more sections, designed and equipped to contain not
more than two dwelling units to be used with or without a foundation
27
28
29
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36
the court held that the automobile exception did not apply.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
motor home was within the scope of the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement. 3 7 The Court determined that the motor home was readily mobile 38 and as with all other vehicles was
afforded a lesser expectation of privacy due to its governmental
39
regulation and the need for effective law enforcement.
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement was
first considered by the Supreme Court in 1925 in Carroll v. United
States.4" In Carroll, two federal prohibition agents stopped an automobile suspected of transporting contraband. 4 ' Although the
agents had probable cause to believe that there was contraband
inside the automobile,4 2 they were unable to detain their suspects

system. Mobilehome does not include a recreational vehicle, commercial coach, or factory-built housing, as defined in § 19971.
The Court further noted that the mobile home, in the case at bar, had "at least
a bed, a refrigerator, a table, chairs, curtains and storage cabinets[,]" thus illustrating the vehicle's similarities to a residence. People v. Carney, 34 Cal.3d at 606-07,
668 P.2d at 812, 194 Cal.Rptr. at 505. Accordingly, the court concluded that "the
configuration of the furnishings, together with the use of the motor home for all
manner of strictly personal purposes, strongly suggests that the structure at issue is
more properly treated as a residency than a mere automobile." Id. (emphasis
added).
36 Id.
37 Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-92.
38 Id. at 390-93. The Court noted that "ready mobility [is] one of the principle
bases of the automobile exceptions." Id. at 390 (citations omitted). Moreover,
ChiefJustice Burger recognized that "the mobility of automobiles . . . 'creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of
the warrant requirement is impossible.' " Id. at 391 (citation omitted).
39 Id. at 392-93. ChiefJustice Burger posited that the "reduced expectations of
privacy derive not from the fact that the area to be reached is in plain view, but
from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways." Id. at 392. Moreover the Court noted:
"Automobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing
governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection
and licensing requirements. As an everyday occurrence, police stop and
examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise,
are noted, or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper
working order."
Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)).
40

267 U.S. 132 (1925).

Id. at 136. The federal prohibition agents did not expect to encounter the
defendants at that particular time. Id.
42 Id. at 160. The Supreme Court's finding of probable cause was based on the
agents' previous encounters with Carroll and his cohorts. Id. Months earlier, the
occupants of the vehicle offered to sell liquor to undercover agents, however, the
deal was never completed. Id. Subsequently, the agents observed these individuals
41
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without a warrant.4 3 Rather than allowing the suspects to drive
away with possible evidence, the agents conducted a warrantless
search of the automobile that resulted in the seizure of contraband.4 4 The Supreme Court upheld both the search and the
convictions.4 5
The CarrollCourt set forth two requirements for a valid warrantless automobile search. First, the officer must have probable
cause to search the vehicle. 4 6 Second, there must be an exigent
circumstance preventing the officer from obtaining a warrant
prior to conducting the search.4 7 The Carroll Court recognized
that the mobility of the automobile created such an exigency
since valuable evidence could be moved prior to the issuance of a
search warrant.4 8
traveling on the road between Grand Rapids and Detroit, a route known for liquor
trafficking. Id.
In dissent, Justice McReynolds challenged the Court's finding of probable
cause. Id. at 171 (McReynoldsJ., dissenting). Justice McReynolds contended that
the only circumstance which would have given the agents a reasonable suspicion
was their previous encounter, but that even then, no sale took place. Id. at 174
(McReynolds, J., dissenting). With the subsequent arrest occurring over two
months later, Justice McReynolds questioned whether a man who once promised to
deliver liquor, but had not, would be subject to arrest whenever he drove on a
Detroit road. Id.
Professor Katz suggests that the Court's finding of probable cause may have
been based on hindsight supported by the contraband found in the automobile. See
Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations in the Warrant Clause, 19 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 557, 564 n.40 (1982).
43 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156-58. At common law, in order to arrest a person for a
misdemeanor, the officer needed a warrant or had to witness the commission of the
offense. Id. at 157. The defendants' claimed that an "offense is not committed in
an [officer's] presence unless he can by his senses detect that the liquor is being
transported." Id. Under this theory, the suspects could not be arrested until the
liquor was discovered. See 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 24 (2d ed. 1987).
Today, however, the preferred view is that an "officer needs only probable cause to
believe [that the misdemeanor] is being committed in his presence; detection by the
natural senses is not required." Katz, supra note 42, at 564 n.42.
44 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 136.
45 Id. at 162.
46 Id. at 156. Probable cause has been defined as follows: "If the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution
in believing that the offense has been committed, it is sufficient." Stacey v. Emery,
97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878). For a detailed discussion on the topic of probable cause,
see generally 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 43, at 539-749, 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 43, at
1-115.
47 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54.
48 Id. at 150-54. The Court discussed various acts of Congress since the adoption of the fourth amendment to
show that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since
the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference

1987]

NOTES

743

For the next forty-five years, however, the Supreme Court
rarely referred to the Carroll doctrine.4 " Instead, the Court relied
on the "search incident to arrest" rationale for cases involving
warrantless automobile searches. 5" This reasoning was based on
the Court's liberal interpretation of the "search incident to
arrest" doctrine to justify warrantless searches of areas beyond
the immediate control of the arrested person. 5 Then in 1969, in
Chimel v. California, 2 the Court limited the scope of the "search
incident to arrest" doctrine by sanctioning warrantless searches
of the area only within the immediate control of the arrested person.5 3 As a result of Chimel's effect on the "search incident to
arrest" doctrine, Carroll was given a renewed importance. 54
In 1970, the Supreme Court considered the Carroll doctrine
in Chambers v. Maroney.5 5 In Chambers, the police received a detailed description of a vehicle and four men suspected of armed
robbery. 56 The officers stopped an automobile meeting the description.5 7 The occupants were arrested and the police impounded the vehicle to the police station, where a warrantless
between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect
of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search
of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought.
Id. at 153.
49 See Note, supra note 1, at 112-13. The automobile exception was used for
warrantless searches conducted prior to arrests. 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 43, at 24.
Most of these cases involved the enforcement of prohibition laws. Id. See, e.g.,
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S.
251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
50 See 3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 43, at 24-25.
51 Id. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (valid search of
multi-room apartment); Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 964 (1967) (valid search of car parked in driveway while suspect was
arrested at front door of his house).
52 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
53 Id. at 762-63. Chimel limited the search incident to arrest to the area within
the immediate control of the arrested person, thereby encompassing the area in
which a suspect might reach for a weapon or attempt to destroy evidence. See id.
54 See generally 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 43, at 25.
55 399 U.S. 42 (1970).

56 Id. at 44. In Chambers, a service station was robbed by two armed men. Id.
Two teenagers who had earlier noticed a blue station wagon circling around the
block by the service station, saw it speed away. Id. At about the same time, the
teenagers heard about the robbery. Id. The teenagers called the police and provided detailed descriptions of the vehicle and its occupants. Id.
57 Id. Within an hour, the police stopped a vehicle meeting the description approximately two miles from the service station. Id.
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search was conducted.5" The Court maintained that there was
probable cause and sufficient exigent circumstances to justify a
warrantless search of the automobile at the time the vehicle was
initially pulled over.5 9 The Court, therefore, reasoned that since
the search would have been valid at the scene of the incident, it
was also permissible at the police station. 6' The Court then held
that given probable cause, there was no difference between seizing and holding a vehicle in order to procure a warrant and conducting an immediate warrantless search. 6 ' Thus, the Court
sanctioned a warrantless search of the vehicle, even though that
vehicle had been effectively immobilized.6 2
58 Id. In conducting the warrantless automobile search, the police found two
revolvers, as well as business cards of another service station that had been robbed
the previous week. Id. The owner of the automobile and one of his cohorts were
indicted for both robberies. Id. at 45 n.1.
59 Id. at 52. The Chambers Court maintained that there was sufficient probable
cause to search the vehicle when it was stopped and that the exigency requirement
was fulfilled because the vehicle was a "fleeting target." Id. Furthermore, the court
stated that:
In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable
cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by
the Constitution. As a general rule, it has also required the judgment of
a magistrate on the probable-cause issue and the issuance of a warrant
before a search is made. Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search.
Id. at 51.
60 Id. at 52. The Court maintained that the probable cause and mobility of the
vehicle were still present at the police station "unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a
warrant is secured." Id.
The Court also noted that the suspects were arrested in a dark parking lot at
night. Id. at 52 n. 10. The Court, therefore, remarked that it was neither safe, nor
practical for the police to conduct a proper search, and that it was reasonable to
impound the vehicle. Id.
Justice Harlan, however, asserted in his dissent that a warrant should have
been obtained after the seizure of the vehicle. Id. at 63-65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
He maintained that the occupants of a vehicle should have a choice to either consent to an immediate search or have the vehicle seized and a magistrate justify a
search. Id.
61 Id. at 52.
62 Id. at 51-52. To many commentators, Chambers had emasculated the exigency
requirement by sanctioning a warrantless search of an immobilized vehicle. See,
e.g., Katz, supra note 42, at 568; Gardner, supra note 5, at 8-9. This view, however,
was complicated by the Court's decision in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971). The Coolidge Court, in a plurality opinion, held a warrantless search of
an impounded automobile to be invalid and not within the scope of the automobile
exception. Id. at 458-64. For a discussion of Coolidge and its significance, see infra
notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
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One year later, the Supreme Court again reviewed the automobile exception in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.63 In Coolidge, the
accused was suspected of murdering a young girl.64 The police
were issued warrants for Coolidge's arrest and for the search of
his vehicles. 65 Although Coolidge was arrested in his home, the
police impounded the vehicles which were parked on his driveway.6 Subsequently, the police conducted a search of the vehicles at the police station. 67 The Court found that the search
warrant was invalid because it was not issued by a "neutral and
detached magistrate. ' 68 The Court then held that this search was
outside the scope of the automobile exception and thus invalid.69
In so holding, the Court distinguished Coolidge from Chambers. 70 In Coolidge, unlike Chambers, the police could not have conducted a valid search at the scene of the incident. 7 ' The Court
also determined that the suspect in Coolidge had no access to his
72
automobile and thus the opportunity to search was not fleeting.
The Court, therefore, maintained that exigent circumstances, as
well as probable cause were necessary for a valid warrantless au63 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion).
64 Id. at 446.
65 Id. at 446-47.
66 Id. at 447.
67 Id. The vehicles were impounded approximately two and one-half hours after
the arrest. Id. One of the vehicles was searched three times: once two days after the
arrest, then a year later and finally six months after that. Id. at 447-48.
68 Id.

at 449.

69 Id. at 461-64. The Court stated that:
The word "automobile" is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away and disappears. And surely there is nothing in
this case to invoke the meaning and purpose of the rule of Carroll v.
United States-no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity
on an open highway after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen
goods or weapons, no confederates waiting to move the evidence....
Id. at 461-62.
70 Id. at 463-64. In Chambers, the Court held that if a warrantless search could
have been conducted at the time of the incident, it may also occur later at the police
station. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52. The Coolidge Court, on the other hand, held that
since a warrantless search would have been invalid at the time of arrest, the search
at the police station was not valid. Id. at 463-64.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 460. The Court found that there were no exigent circumstances. Id.
Coolidge had been a suspect for some time and yet remained cooperative throughout the investigation. Id. He had had the opportunity to flee or destroy evidence
for some time and had failed to do so. Id. Furthermore, the Court remarked that
"[t]he opportunity to search was thus hardly 'fleeting.' " Id. When the police arrived at Coolidge's residence, two officers guarded the back door while the others
entered through the front. Coolidge was arrested without resistance and he had no
opportunity to get to his vehicle. Id.
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tomobile search. 7 3
In the 1974 case of Cardwellv. Lewis, 7 4 the Court, in a plurality opinion, adopted the lesser expectation of privacy rationale
for the automobile exception.7 5 In Cardwell, a murder.victim was
found laying next to his automobile.7 6 The police took tire prints
from the area, as well as paint scrapings from the vehicle. 7 7 Several months later, Lewis, the prime suspect in the case, was arrested after being interrogated at the investigating authorities'
office. 78 His vehicle, which had been parked in a public lot, was
impounded by the police.7 9 Without a warrant, the officers made
a cast impression of the tires and took paint samples from the
vehicle.8" The Court upheld the officers' inspection of the exterior of the automobile finding that the police had probable cause
73 Id. at 458-59. The Coolidge plurality's requirement of exigency has not been
followed. See Gardner, supra note 5, at 12-13. In light of the lesser expectation of
privacy rationale, and the Court's justification of inherent mobility, the exigency
requirement has been severely emasculated. See id., supra note 5, at 12-13.
In 1975, the Court seemingly upheld a warrantless vehicle search on probable
cause alone in Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam). There, White was
arrested while he was trying to cash bad checks at a bank drive-through window. Id.
at 67. An officer saw White try to hide something. Id. The police then impounded
his vehicle and conducted a warrantless search. Id. at 68. The Court upheld the
search because the police had probable cause to believe evidence was in the vehicle.
Id. The opinion made no mention of either lesser expectation of privacy or exigent
circumstances.
Since White, however, the Court has looked to the inherent mobility of a vehicle. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 424 (1981) (plurality opinion);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
74 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality opinion).
75 Id. at 589-91. Justice Harlan originally proposed the reasonable expectation
of privacy analysis in his concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) where he set forth a two part test to determine whether an individual's expectation of privacy should be protected. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,J., concurring). Justice Harlan stated, that first, "a person [must] have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " Id. This approach was later
adopted by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979).
76 Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 586. The victim died as a result of gun shot wounds. Id.
The vehicle, which had been driven over an embankment, was found in the brush
along the Olentangy River in Delaware County, Ohio. Id.
77 Id. Shortly after the victim's death, the police questioned Lewis at his place of
business. Id. While there, the police observed Lewis' vehicle. Id.
78 Id. Several months had passed before the police asked Lewis to appear at the
Office of the Division of Criminal Activities for interrogation. Id.
79 Id. at 587-88.
80 Id. at 588. The day after the arrest, a police technician examined Lewis's vehicle. Id. He determined that the tread on the vehicle's tire matched a cast impression taken at the scene of the incident. Id. The technician further maintained that
the paint samples taken from Lewis's vehicle were the same "color, texture [and]
order of layering" as the paint chips taken from the deceased's vehicle. Id.
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and the search was conducted in a reasonable manner."' In so
doing, the Court maintained that people have lesser expectations
of privacy in their automobiles than in their homes.8 2 In support
of this proposition, the Court reasoned that a vehicle's principle
function is transportation which is conducted in public view. 3
Moreover, the Court distinguished the exterior of a vehicle from
the interior.8 4 The Court noted that the interior of a vehicle
can
5
contain personal effects warranting further protection.
The Cardwell Court also found that there was no constitutional violation for searching a vehicle after it had been impounded. 6 The Court distinguished Coolidge on two grounds.8 7
First, the scope of the search was more extensive in Coolidge because it involved the interior of the vehicle."" Second, the automobile in Coolidge was parked on private property, whereas, in
Cardwell,"9 the vehicle was seized from a public location where
access was less restricted.9 ° The Cardwell Court further held that
81 Id. at 592.
82 Id. at 589-91.
83 Id.
The Cardwell Court noted that "[t]he search of an automobile is far less
intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of
one's person or of a building." Id. at 590 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell,J., concurring)). The Court observed that
a vehicle is always in the public eye because its main function is to travel on public
roads. Id. at 590.
In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the Court maintained that the
governmental regulation of vehicles further diminished the public's expectation of
privacy. Id. at 12-13.
84 Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 591-92.
85 Id. With regard to the exterior of a vehicle, the Court found that such an
invasion of privacy "if it can be said to exist [would be] abstract and theoretical."
Id. at 592 (quoting Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S.
861, 865 (1974)). The Court, thus concluded that "where probable cause exists, a
warrantless examination of the exterior of a car is not unreasonable under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 592. The Court observed that the
fourth amendment had traditionally protected the interior of vehicles. Id. at 591.
86 Id. at 592-93.
87 Id. at 593.
88 Id. The Court maintained that Coolidge involved "a thorough and extensive
search of the entire automobile including the interior .. " Id. at 593 n.9. On the
other hand, Cardwell only involved a search of the vehicle's exterior which consisted
of an inspection of a tire and the taking of paint samples. Id. Thus, the court noted
that the search in Coolidge warranted additional considerations as to the defendant's
expectation of privacy. Id.
" Id. at 593. Chambers presented the same situation that existed in Cardwell. Id.
In both cases, the defendants vehicles were seized from unrestricted public areas.
Id.
9o Id. at 593. The Cardwell Court observed that in Coolidge, the vehicle was on
private property, whereas in Cardwell and Chambers, the vehicle was on public property. Id.
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a warrantless search is not rendered unconstitutional because
there was an opportunity to obtain a search warrant. 9 '
The lesser expectation of privacy rationale has also been
used by the Court in determining whether a warrantless search of
containers located inside a vehicle was within the scope of the
automobile exception.9 2 The Supreme Court addressed this issue in United States v. Chadwick.9 3 In Chadwick, the defendants
were arrested immediately after they had placed a footlocker in
the trunk of an automobile.9 4 The federal agents had probable
cause to believe that the footlocker contained marijuana.9 5 The
agents impounded the vehicle and then, without a warrant,
opened the sealed container and discovered marijuana.9 6 The
Court held that the automobile exception was not applicable because the agents had probable cause to search the footlocker but
not the vehicle itself.97 Moreover, the Court maintained that a
footlocker was not open for public view
and had a greater expec98
tation of privacy than an automobile.
In 1982, the Supreme Court extended the automobile ex91 Id. at 595-96.
92 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. 420 (1981); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
93 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
94 Id. at 3-4.
95 Id. at 3. The agents had been notified by their counterparts from another
state that an individual named Machado, a suspected drug trafficker, would be arriving on a train carrying a footlocker. Id. Moreover, the footlocker was leaking
talcum powder, which is used to disguise the smell of marijuana. Id. The agents'
suspicions were further verified when their trained drug-sniffing dog indicated that
there was a controlled substance inside the footlocker. Id. at 3-4.
96 Id.
97 See

id. at 1 1-13.
Id. The Court maintained that:
The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do
not apply to [luggage]. Luggage contents are not open to public view
...nor is luggage subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny on
a continuing basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is
transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects.
In sum, a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.
Id. at 13.
Chadwick was later upheld in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) and in
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion). In Sanders, the
Court upheld Chadwick, stating that a warrantless search of luggage does not come
under the automobile exception. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 763-65. The Sanders Court
observed that there are greater expectations of privacy in regards to personal luggage and that it was easier to seize and hold luggage while waiting for a warrant
than an automobile. Id. The Court, however, did hold that if the contents of the
98
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ception to include containers transported in vehicles in United
States v. Ross.9 9 In Ross, two officers stopped a vehicle which they
had probable cause to believe contained contraband.'
An officer, without a warrant, opened a closed paper bag that was inside the vehicle's trunk and found heroin.' 0 ' The Court upheld
the search, finding that if probable cause justified the warrantless
search of a vehicle, the officer could search every part of that vehicle including its contents for the object of the search. 0 2
Despite the Supreme Court's holdings, the standard used to
determine when the automobile exception was applicable remained unsettled. 0 3 As a result, the circuit courts were split in
their decisions regarding the automobile exception's applicability
to mobile homes. 0 4 The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in
California v. Carney.' °5
In Carney, the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of
a motor home located in a public parking lot.'0 6 The Court
looked to the "ready mobility" of the motor home, 10 7 as well as
luggage can be inferred from its appearance, a warrantless search of that container
could be conducted. Id. at 764 n.13.
In Robbins, police opened the trunk of an automobile after they had discovered
marijuana in its passenger compartment. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 422
(1981) (plurality opinion). They opened two packages found inside the trunk,
which contained marijuana. Id. In a plurality opinion, the Court held that the
search was invalid under Sanders. Id. at 428. Robbins was later overruled in United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
99 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
100 Id. at 800-01. In Ross, a reliable informant contacted a detective and told him
that an individual known as the "Bandit" was selling drugs out of his vehicle's trunk
at a certain address. Id. at 801. The information also included a description of the
suspect and the vehicle. Id.
101 Id. The officers noticed a bullet on the front seat. Id. They then found a.gun
in the glove compartment. Id. The officers then arrested Ross, took his car keys
and opened the trunk. Id. An officer found a closed paper bag, opened it and
discovered contraband. Id.
102 Id. at 825.
103 Gardner, supra note 5, at 2. Since Chambers, there has been much confusion
over the automobile exception. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 43, at 27-28.
104 Several cases have upheld warrantless searches of mobile homes based on the
automobile exception: See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 740 F.2d 878 (11 th Cir.
1984); United States v. Kelly, 683 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972
(1982); United States v. Combs, 672 F.2d 574 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111
(1982); United States v. Hudson, 601 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Miller, 460 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1972). The Ninth Circuit, however, has found such
searches unconstitutional because mobile homes have a greater expectation of privacy than automobiles. See, e.g., United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir.
1981); United States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1980).
105 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
106 Id. at 393.
107

Id. at 390-93.
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the reduced expectation of privacy which stems from the governmental regulation of motor vehicles."0 8 The Court further found
that the search was not unreasonable because the agents had
"abundant" probable cause to search the vehicle.' 0 9
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,"10 reviewed
the mobility rationale set forth in Carroll"' and noted the "longrecognized distinction between -stationary structures and vehi-

cles." 2 The ChiefJustice observed that this dichotomy was premised on the theory that a vehicle could be quickly moved before
a warrant was obtained." 13 The majority also noted that mobility
was not the sole justification for the automobile exception." 4
The Carney Court reaffirmed the lesser expectation of privacy accorded to motor vehicles"1 5 maintaining that government regulation of motor vehicles caused this reduced expectation of
privacy. 16
In Carney, Chief Justice Burger found both rationales applicable." 7 Although the motor home was found stationary in a location not normally used for residential purposes, it was
nevertheless capable of being driven away.i8 The majority, thus,
Id. at 392-93.
109 Id. at 395. The Court concluded:
108

This search was not unreasonable; it was plainly one that the magistrate could authorize if presented with these facts. The DEA agents had
fresh, direct, uncontradicted evidence that the respondent was distributing a controlled substance from the vehicle, apart from evidence of
other possible offenses. The agents thus had abundant probable cause
to enter and search the vehicle for evidence of a crime notwithstanding
its possible use as a dwelling place.
Id.
110 Id. at 387. ChiefJustice Burger's opinion was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. Id.
I I I Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-92. For a discussion of the Carroll doctrine, see supra
notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
112 Id. at 390.
113 See id. at 390-94.
114 Id. at 391.
115 Id. The Court stated that:
[b]esides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements
govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office.
Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976)).
116 Id. at 392. The Carney Court noted that motor vehicles are subject to various
government regulations. Id. Some examples of these regulations include periodic
inspections, licensing requirements, and every day police stops for various violations or for notification of faulty safety equipment. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368).
1'7 Id. at 392-93.
118 Id. Chief Justice Burger maintained that the vehicle could be readily moved
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refused to distinguish the motor home from other vehicles."t 9
The Court further noted that such a distinction would require a
differentiation in accordance with a vehicle's size or appointments. 120 While observing that the motor home had some of the
attributes of a residence,121 ChiefJustice Burger maintained that
the automobile exception never turned on a vehicle's other possible uses.' 22 Rather, the Court determined that the crucial issue
was whether the vehicle was readily mobile and whether it was
located in a setting which would objec tively
indicate that it was
23
being used for transportation purposes.
In conclusion, the Court maintained that the search was not
unreasonable. 124 The Court observed that the agents possessed
"fresh, direct, and uncontradicted evidence" that Carney was distributing narcotics.1 25Thus, the majority held that the agents had
12 6
sufficient probable cause to enter and search the motor home.
by the mere turn of a key. Id. at 393. The Chief Justice further stated that the
lesser expectation of privacy given to a vehicle was not applicable to a fixed dwelling. Id.
119 Id. at 393-94. The Court reasoned:
In our increasingly mobile society, many vehicles used for transportation can be and are being used not only for transportation but for shelter, i.e., as a "home" or "residence."
To distinguish between
respondent's motor home and an ordinary sedan for purposes of the
vehicle exception would require that we apply the exception depending
upon the size of the vehicle and the quality of its appointments. Moreover, to fail to apply the exception to vehicles such as a motor home
ignores the fact that a motor home lends itself easily to use as an instrument for illicit drug traffic and other legal activity.
Id.
120 Id. ChiefJustice Burger remarked that in Ross, the Court "declined to distinguish between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' containers." Id. at 394 (citing Ross, 456 U.S.
at 822). Thus, he declined to distinguish "between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' vehicles" which are either located on public roadways or situated in a manner where
one could reasonably see that it was not being used as a residence. Id.
121 Id. at 393. The dissent observed that the motor home had "substantial living
space inside: stuffed chairs surround[ing] a table; cupboards provid[ing] room for
storage of personal effects; bunkbeds provid[ing] sleeping space; and a refrigerator
provid[ing] ample space for food and beverages." Id. at 406 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
122 Id. at 394.
123 Id. ChiefJustice Burger maintained that these requirements ensured that law
enforcement officers' efforts in detecting criminal activity are not unnecessarily
delayed and that the public's privacy interests are protected. Id.
124 Id. at 395. The Court noted that the automobile exception waives "[o]nly the
prior approval of the magistrate" and that the search must be consistent with how a
magistrate would have authorized it. Id. at 394 (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 823).
125 Id. at 395. See supra note 16 and accompanying text for a description of the
evidence which the agents had prior to the search.
126 Id. at 395.
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens characterized the
motor home as a "hybrid."' 127 TheJustice contended that the vehicle's hybrid character placed it somewhere between the privacy
interests forbidding warrantless searches of the home and the law
enforcement interests justifying the "warrantless searches of
automobiles based on probable cause." 1 28 Justice Stevens mainby upholding the
tained that the majority erred in three respects
1 29
exception.
automobile
the
under
search
First, the dissent contended that the Court had lost confidence in the state and federal courts' ability to enforce the fourth
amendment. 130 Justice Stevens stated that this lack of confidence
had resulted in the Court's "improvident exercise of discretionThus, the Court had been overburdened
ary jurisdiction." '
3 2
Juswith cases offering fact bound errors of little significance.'

tice Stevens then asserted that the Court had prematurely decided this issue without allowing possible development of
alternative principles in the lower courts.' 3 The dissent maintained that this development of various approaches should have
taken place in the lower courts before the Court adopted a na34
tionwide rule. 1

Second, the dissent posited that the Court had given priority
127 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion was joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall. Id. Justice Stevens contended that the "character
of 'the place to be searched' " was an important factor in Fourth Amendment analysis. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). He therefore thought that the
California Supreme Court had correctly characterized the motor home as a "hybrid." Id. (citing People v. Carney, 34 Cal.3d 597, 606, 668 P.2d 807, 812, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 500, 606 (1983)).
128 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 395-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that unless a correct
order suppressing evidence has been granted, a petition for certiorari was likely to
receive the necessary four votes for plenary review. Id. Accordingly, Justice Stevens stated that many state legal officers have filed petitions for certiorari in "even
the most frivolous search and seizure cases." Id.
131 Id. at 396-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 396 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In justification of this claim, the dissent
cited Oklahoma v. Castleberry, 471 U.S. 146 (1985); United States v. Sharpe, 470
U.S. 675 (1985); and United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 778 (1985).
'33 Carney, 471 U.S. at 399 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 400 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens maintained that the lower
courts should have had more time to debate various approaches in deciding
whether a motor home was within the scope of the automobile exception. Id.
Thus, the dissent posited that the majority's holding established a nationwide rule
before the conflict had fully developed, whereas if the lower court was affirmed,
only one state would be governed by that decision. Id. at 398-99.
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to the exception, rather than the rule.' 35 Justice Stevens noted
that the Carroll Court had held that "in cases where the securing
of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used."' 13 6 The
Justice, therefore, asserted that if a motor home was a hybrid
which fell between the rule requiring a warrant and the mandates
of the automobile exception,
priority should have been given to
37
requirement.
warrant
the
Finally, the dissent argued that a warrantless search of a motor home was reasonable only when it was traveling on public
roads or when other exigent circumstances were present. 13 8 Justice Stevens maintained that the majority relied on the inherent
mobility of the motor home to "create a conclusive presumption
of exigency." 139 The Justice then added that inherent mobility
alone cannot justify a warrantless search. 4 ° Moreover, Justice
Stevens contended that the owner of a motor home has a substantial expectation of privacy when it is used as a residence. 4 '
Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that a warrantless search of the
"living quarters" in a motor home was "presumptively unreasonable absent exigent circumstances.' 4 2
Carney is significant for more than the extension of the automobile exception to mobile homes. The Carney Court essentially
expanded the automobile exception to parked vehicles. Moreover, the Court finally developed a clear view of the automobile
exception and the confusion surrounding the exigency require135 Id. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens recited the general rule
that " 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject
only to a few specifically established well delineated exceptions.' " Id. (quoting
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
136 Id. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 807).
137 Id. at 402 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the vehicle was
parked in an "off-the-street lot" and that the agents had the element of surprise
because curtains were covering the windshield. Id. The Justice thus asserted that
there was no real threat of mobility. Id.
140 Id. at 402 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141 Id. Justice Stevens observed that this motor home was designed to "accommodate a breadth of ordinary everyday living." Id. at 406 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
He maintained that although a motor home "may not be a castle, it is usually the
functional equivalent of a hotel room, a vacation and retirement home, or a hunting
and fishing cabin." Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Stevens contended a motor home deserves a higher expectation of privacy. Id. at 407-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 408 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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ment was resolved. 4 3 Furthermore, the question of whether to
apply the exigency or lesser expectation of privacy rationale is no
longer a consideration. The Carney Court had for all intents and
purposes eliminated both rationales. Carney finalizes the position
held by some courts and commentators who had maintained that
probable cause alone was sufficient for a valid warrantless vehicle
search.
After Carney, a law enforcement officer may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle based solely upon probable cause.
No longer must a vehicle be in transit to be considered mobile
because all vehicles are viewed by the Court as inherently mobile.' 4 4 In other words, a vehicle can be made readily mobile by
the mere turn of the ignition key.1 4 5 Moreover, since all vehicles
are under governmental regulation, they all possess a reduced
expectation of privacy. 146 The Court further held that there is no
distinction between a motor home and an automobile; both are
vehicles, both are readily mobile, and both have reduced expectations of privacy.147 Probable cause, therefore, is the sole requirement to conduct a warrantless vehicle search.
The requirement that a warrant to search a vehicle must be
48
obtained when reasonably practicable is no longer applicable. 1
143 Many commentators viewed Chambers as a severe limitation on the exigency
requirement. See Note, supra note 1, at 111-12; Gardner, supra note 5, at 8-10. See
supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of Chambers. The
Coolidge decision further obfuscated the situation. See Gardner, supra note 5, at 1013. Decided a year after Chambers, the Coolidge Court invalidated the warrantless
search of an impounded vehicle which had been parked on the suspect's driveway
while he was in the house. Id. The status of the exigency requirement was further
in doubt with the adoption of the lesser expectation of privacy rationale in Cardwell.
See supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Court seemed at times
to have upheld a warrantless search on probable cause alone. See Texas v. White,
423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam). Since White, however, the Court has looked to the
inherent mobility of a vehicle. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 424 (1981)
(plurality opinion); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,12 (1977).
144 Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-93.
145 Id. at 393.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 393-94. The Court, however, stated that its holding did not encompass
those motor homes situated in a manner that would "objectively indicate[] it was
being used as a residence." Id. at 394 n.3. In this situation, the Court remarked
that it would look -at such factors as whether the motor home was up on blocks,
licensed as a vehicle, connected to public utilities, and if it had convenient access to
a public roadway. Id.
148 See id. at 401-02 (Stevens,J., dissenting).. Justice Stevens noted in his dissent
that the Carroll Court . had held that "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is
reasonably practicable, it must be used." Id. at 401 (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 807).
This is no longer the rule, but rather is now the exception. See id. at 402. An officer
who can reasonably obtain a warrant without any fear of losing evidence is no
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In essence, the Court has given priority to the exception rather
than to the rule.' 4 9 Since a law enforcement officer needs only
probable cause to conduct a warrantless vehicle search, there is
no incentive to obtain a warrant. In, Carney, two agents maintained surveillance over a parked motor home for over an
hour. 1 5 Although the motor home was located two blocks from
the court house, the agents never attempted to obtain a search
warrant. 15 ' Since this conduct is now permissible, one must wonder about the status of the search warrant in regard to all other
vehicle searches.
It is apparent that the Carney majority and dissent have
adopted extreme views without finding a common ground. The
ultimate policy behind the automobile exception is to provide law
enforcement officials with an easier means of obtaining evidence
and arresting criminals, while still protecting individuals' fourth
amendment rights. In Carney, however,, the majority has expanded the automobile exception to the point of sacrificing the
true meaning of the fourth amendment. The dissent, on the
other hand, sought to return to the Carroll doctrine. Yet, if one
believes that there should be a balance between the need for effective law enforcement and the protection of individual fourth
amendment rights, the court should have adopted an approach
somewhere between the two divergent views.
The Court's inability to strike this balance resulted from the
disagreement over the proper scope of the exigency and lesser
expectation of privacy rationales. The majority looked to the inherent mobility of the vehicle, 152 whereas the dissent maintained
that absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless search could be
15 3
conducted only when the vehicle had been stopped in transit.
The majority clearly lost sight of the purpose of the automobile
exception, as well as an individual's fourth amendment rights.
The most significant reason for the automobile exception was to
prevent the loss of valuable evidence due to the exigency caused
by a vehicle's mobility. The question arises-is it enough to say
longer required to get that warrant for vehicle searches.. Rather, all that officer
needs is probable cause and he may conduct a warrantless vehicle search. See id.
149 See supra notes 134-142 and accompanying text for Justice Stevens' view that
the Court has followed the exception, rather than the rule. For a discussion of
whether the Court has given priority to the rule or the exception prior to the Camey
decision, see Katz, supra note 42, at 558-62.
150 Carney, 471 U.S. at 388.
151 See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
152 Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-93.
153 Id. at 402 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that a parked vehicle is readily mobile and thus satisfies the purpose for the exception just because it could be started by the
mere turn of an ignition key? The answer to this question is no.
Justice Stevens was correct in recognizing the need for some exigency prior to the stopping of a vehicle in transit. Absent these
circumstances, there is an insignificant difference between a
parked motor home and a residence to justify a bright line approach sanctioning warrantless searches. In essence, by eliminating the mobility requirement, the Carney Court expanded the
automobile exception while simultaneously forgetting its
purpose.
A further dispute between the majority and dissent concerned the status of the lesser expectation of privacy rationale.
The Carney Court held that a motor home was accorded a reduced expectation of privacy due to its governmental regula-

tion, 154 as well as the need for effective law enforcement. 155

Alternatively, the dissent maintained that the majority's opinion
conflicted with prior law under United States v. Chadwick.' 56 Justice Stevens reasoned that a parked motor home had a greater
expectation of privacy than a movable footlocker. 57 Thus, since
a warrantless search of a moveable container was held invalid in
Chadwick,' 58 the dissent asserted that59such a search of a parked
motor home should also be invalid.'
In reviewing the lesser expectation of privacy rationale, the
majority seems to have taken a better approach. It would be improper for a court to differentiate between vehicles, unless one
could objectively state that the vehicle was being used primarily
as a residence, rather than as a means of transportation. While
Id. at 392.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 404-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra notes 93-98 and accompanying
text for a detailed discussion of Chadwick.
157 Carney, 471 U.S. at 404-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens reviewed
how the Ross Court had interpreted Chadwick:
The Court in Chadwick specifically rejected the argument that the
warrantless search was "reasonable" because a footlocker has some of
the mobile characteristics that support warrantless searches of
automobiles. The Court recognized that a "person's expectations of
privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile," [], and noted that the practical problems associated with the temporary detention of a piece of luggage during the period of time
necessary to obtain a warrant are significantly less than those associated
with the detention of an automobile.
Carney, 471 U.S. at 405 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 811).
158 Id. at 404-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 405-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154
155
156
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the dissent is correct in maintaining that a mobile home has a
greater expectation of privacy than a movable footlocker, it failed
to persuasively illustrate why the Court should differentiate mobile homes from other vehicles. While conceding a mobile home
often has many of the amenities of a residence, the dissent failed
to provide a method for differentiating between the vehicles.
The dissent could not have meant that all mobile homes are
outside the scope of the automobile exception. If this were so,
litigation would arise over custom style vans, as well as other motor vehicles similar to mobile homes. Clearly, the majority has
adopted a more consistent stance by treating all vehicles alike,
unless the vehicle could be objectively viewed as being used primarily as a residence.
In analyzing the Carney opinions, it is, therefore, apparent
that the Court should have adopted an approach more consistent
with the meaning of the automobile exception. While the Court
was correct in not differentiating between types of vehicles, the
Court should not have extended the exception to parked vehicles. The Court could have returned to the true intent of the
automobile exception by reinstating the mobility requirement,
while at the same time recognizing, although not expanding, the
lesser expectation of privacy rationale.
The Court, however, has chosen a different route. Priority
has been given to the automobile exception, rather than to the
warrant requirement. Carney has been interpreted as extending
the automobile exception to parked vehicles.' 60 How much
more, however, can this exception be expanded? It now applies
to all vehicles, parked or mobile and the only requirement for a
warrantless search is probable cause. Thus, the only move left is
back toward Carroll. While such a shift does not appear imminent, one would hope that it is inevitable.
Edward T Kole
160 See United States v. Bagley, 765 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1985) (warrantless search
of parked vehicle in public place justified solely on probable cause).

